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Abstract	
Optimal decision-making entails outcome evaluation, comparing received costs and 
benefits with predicted costs and benefits. The anterior cingulate cortex (ACC), a brain area with 
major connections to the appetitive and aversive motivation systems, may provide the neural 
substrate of this evaluation process. One way to measure the relative contribution of these 
systems on decision-making is to measure individual differences in risk-taking behaviors. For 
individuals who make risky choices, this evaluation step may be biased: some show a preference 
for immediate, short-term rewards (increased appetitive system), while devaluing the long-term 
consequences of their choices (decreased aversive system). However, most studies supporting 
this theory have utilized monetary loss as the punishment. Other punishments that represent the 
presence of an aversive outcome, such as delivery of a painful stimulus, may be processed in a 
separate brain area and thus, may have differing effects on decision-making. The current study 
aimed to answer two main questions. First, we asked: is the ACC engaged by both appetitive 
stimuli and aversive stimuli? To answer this question, we recorded the Feedback-Related 
Negativity (FRN) response, a component thought to represent activity of the ACC, during a 
passive reward and punishment prediction task. Results indicated that the FRN responded to 
whether the outcome was A) unexpected and B) delivered or withheld, but not to the valence of 
the outcome. Second, we asked: do individual differences in these two systems have a 
differential impact on decision-making? To answer this question, participants completed a 
gambling task where they had to choose between large and small bets based on a probability of 
winning while we recorded their FRN response. They also completed self-report questionnaires 
	 vi 
indicating their sensitivity to reward/punishment and risk-taking behaviors. Results indicated that 
increased sensitivity of the appetitive system and decreased sensitivity of the aversive system 
(measured by both self-report and ERPs) predicted risky choice on the self-report measure and 
less so on the behavioral measure. Taken together, these results complement those that suggest 
the ACC is involved in evaluating both costs and benefits and may be influenced by both 
appetitive and aversive motivational systems.	
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Contributions of Appetitive and Aversive Motivational Systems to Decision-Making		
 Outcome evaluation is an important step for successful decision-making that entails 
comparing predicted rewards and punishments with received rewards and punishments of some 
choice or action. Considering both the magnitude and the probability of an outcome, the 
expected value (EV), is useful in determining plans for future actions (Bandura, 1977; Von 
Neumann & Morgenstern, 1944). While EV is often discussed in the reward domain, another 
important consideration for decision-making includes a cost (punishing outcomes) to benefit 
(rewarding outcomes) ratio (Skvortsova, Palminteri, & Pessiglione, 2014). Decisions based 
entirely on expected rewards, with no weight given to potential costs would be suboptimal. One 
neural model suggests that the mesolimbic dopamine (DA) reward system is responsible for 
computing the expected value of rewards: different parts of the mesolimbic dopamine system 
calculate different components of EV (Knutson, Taylor, Kaufman, Peterson, & Glover, 2005). 
Subcortical dopaminergic brain regions calculate the magnitude component and cortical 
dopaminergic brain regions calculate the probability, with the cortical regions integrating these 
two pieces of information (Knutson et al., 2005). On the other hand, the neural substrate of 
expected value for punishments or aversive stimuli is less well defined, although several neural 
models of punishment processing exist e.g., the medial pain system (Vogt & Sikes, 2000), the 
septohippocampal system (Gray & McNaughton, 2003), the amygdala (LeDoux, 2000), and 
cortical areas such as the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC; Bissonette, Gentry, Padmala, Pessoa, 
& Roesch, 2014). Because of its overlap with appetitive and aversive systems (Shenhav, 
Botvinick, & Cohen, 2013), the ACC specifically might be responsible for computing 
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motivational prediction errors, i.e., the difference between predicted and received rewards and 
punishments. Integrating motivational prediction errors, the ACC can update option weights for 
future decisions by sending that information along to higher-order perceptual areas to make the 
decision and to motor program areas to carry out the action. Event-related potential (ERP) 
studies of outcome monitoring support this theory and waveforms hypothesized to represent 
ACC function can be used as an index of motivational prediction errors.	
One way to study neural systems of decision-making is to measure individual differences 
in the amount of risk in behavioral choice. Risky decisions especially involve evaluation of both 
appetitive and aversive consequences and therefore can provide important information about 
how these systems contribute to decision-making. For some individuals the evaluation step may 
be biased, leading to impaired motivational prediction errors and thus, risky decision-making. 
For example, risk-takers tend to show a motivational bias: they have a preference for immediate, 
short-term rewards, while devaluing the long-term consequences of their choices (Ainslie, 1975). 
Individual differences in decision-making suggest that the evaluation of expected rewards and 
expected punishments might have distinct neural sources that differentially contribute to the 
variance in risk during decision-making (Pessiglione & Delgado, 2015). To what extent these 
systems contribute to decision-making processes is still not clear. The current study aims to test 
the separate appetitive and aversive systems, how they may converge within the ACC, and how 
we can use individual differences within these systems to predict the amount of risk in 
behavioral choice.	
Neural Systems of Reward and Reward Expectation: Processing Appetitive Outcomes	
Recent neuroscience studies have investigated the hypothesized neural system 
responsible for the evaluation step in reward processing: the dopamine reward system. The 
	 3 
reward system consists of dopaminergic pathways sourced in the ventral tegmental area (VTA) 
with projections to the nucleus accumbens (NAcc), amygdala, and various telencephalic targets 
including the striatum, orbitofrontal cortex (OFC), ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC) and 
anterior cingulate cortex (Wise & Rompre, 1989). Midbrain dopamine neurons appear to code 
the reinforcing properties of naturally occurring stimuli such as food and sexual contact (Fiorillo, 
Tobler, & Schultz, 2003; Hernandez & Hoebel, 1988; Pfaus et al., 1990) as well as that of 
abusive drugs such as cocaine and heroin (Bassareo, De Luca, & Di Chiara, 2007; Kiyatkin & 
Rebec, 2001).	
Midbrain DA neurons, while originally thought to simply code reward, also respond to 
reward prediction violations (Schultz, Dayan, & Montague, 1997). In their pioneering study on 
monkeys, Schultz et al. (1997) discovered that DA neurons within the VTA increased firing 
immediately following an unpredicted reward (i.e., a squirt of juice). After several pairings with 
a conditioned stimulus (i.e., a flash of light), the monkeys began to expect the squirt of juice. DA 
neuronal firing appeared to have shifted in time to the conditioned stimulus onset, rather than the 
onset of the reward itself. Therefore, at the time of the reward, DA neurons did not fire above 
baseline. After sufficient conditioning occurred, the DA neurons only fired to the flash of light 
signaling the reward. However, when the conditioned stimulus was presented but no reward was 
administered, the DA neurons suppressed firing at the time of the predicted reward. Thus, DA 
neurons within the VTA appear to code violations in reward prediction: increased firing to 
unpredicted rewards, suppressed firing to unpredicted withheld rewards, and firing at baseline for 
fully predicted outcomes (Schultz et al., 1997). Subsequently, Schultz (2010) suggested that DA 
neurons might represent the subjective, rather than objective value of a rewarding outcome. For 
example, midbrain DA neuronal responses significantly decrease over time when rewards are 
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delivered with a delay (Kobayashi & Schultz, 2008; Rodriguez & Logue, 1988). While the 
majority of DA neurons responds to reward predictions and suppresses firing to punishments, a 
small subset of DA neurons is excited to aversive stimuli (e.g., air puffs; Matsumoto & 
Hikosaka, 2009; Mirenowicz & Schultz, 1996). However, because the suppressed neurons are far 
more numerous than the excitatory neurons, these excitatory responses are typically cancelled 
out (Mirenowicz & Schultz, 1996). Thus, Schultz (2010) suggests that the majority of DA 
neurons are related to reward. The processing of aversive stimuli then is largely located in a 
separate system (or systems). In support of this, one early model of decision-making, 
Reinforcement Sensitivity Theory (RST), proposed a neural Behavioral Activation System 
(BAS) that responds to appetitive stimuli and is thought to mediate approach behavior (Gray, 
1987). While recent hypotheses propose that the processing of appetitive stimuli lies within the 
DA reward system, this suggests an overall role of DA within the BAS (Depue & Collins, 1999). 
Therefore an overactive BAS, controlled by the DA pathway, may correspond to reward 
sensitivity.	
Connections from the source of the DA system to its projections are essential for 
reinforcement learning. Specifically, the ACC has been implicated in initiation of goal-directed 
behaviors (Devinsky, Morrell, & Vogt, 1995). The overlap of motor control, cognitive control, 
and motivation in the ACC support its role in combining this information to formulate plans for 
future action (Paus, 2001). For example, the ACC specifically has been implicated in action 
planning in terms of reinforcement learning. Kennerley, Walton, Behrens, Buckley, and 
Rushworth (2006) suggest that the ACC is necessary for learning the value of actions: lesions of 
the ACC in monkeys produced deficits in evaluating risk and reward in a reinforcement-guided 
task.	
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Human hemodynamic studies also show activation of the reward system to reward and 
reward prediction violation, including areas such as the midbrain, ventral striatum, medial 
amygdala, OFC, and areas of medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC; Knutson & Cooper, 2005). One 
fMRI study modeled after the monkey study found that activation in the OFC was larger when 
squirts of juice were unpredicted compared with when they were predicted (Berns, McClure, 
Pagnoni, & Montague, 2001). Additionally, projections of the VTA also respond to monetary 
wins when outcomes are uncertain, e.g., in gambling tasks (Rogers et al., 1999). Although these 
results are consistent with the animal literature, Knutson et al. (2005) suggest that different parts 
of the circuitry may be responsible for different steps in reward processing. For example, the 
ventral striatum is associated with reward cues and anticipation of reward, while the mPFC is 
associated with the processing of rewarding outcomes (Ernst et al., 2004). Overall, the more 
broad medial frontal cortex (MFC) has been implicated in evaluating the motivational value of 
stimuli and behavioral actions (Montague, King-Casas, & Cohen, 2006).	
Neural Systems of Punishment and Punishment Expectation: Processing Aversive 
Outcomes	
Receiving rewarding outcomes is not the only way we can learn from our behavior. 
Often, we learn from punishments that we receive. Neural systems involved in the processing of 
aversive outcomes have largely been studied separately from those involved in the processing of 
appetitive outcomes. Both noxious stimuli and stimuli that induce negative emotions are 
considered “aversive” and serve as indicators to inhibit behaviors associated with those outcomes 
(Cardinal, Parkinson, Hall, & Everitt, 2002; Vogt & Sikes, 2000). The somatic sensation brain 
areas have been described widely in the animal literature and include two pathways that may 
have overlapping areas, but function largely in a distinct manner: the sensory aspect relating to 
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size, location, and intensity of a painful stimulus, processed by mechanoreceptors and the 
hedonic aspect relating to the pleasantness or unpleasantness of the stimulus, processed by 
nociceptors (Sewards & Sewards, 2002a). These aspects are represented in the lateral pain 
pathways including: the spinal cord, trigeminal complex, ventral posteromedial and ventral 
posterolateral thalamic nuclei, and somatosensory areas (Sewards & Sewards, 2002b). The 
amygdala has also been implicated in the emotional aspect of pain (Baumgärtner et al., 2006; 
Gao, Ren, Zhang, & Zhao, 2004). A third, perhaps also distinct aspect, is the motivational aspect 
of pain. This aspect is related to behaviors associated with avoidance and termination of pain and 
other aversive stimuli (Price, 2000). The motivational aspect might be processed in a separate 
medial pain system consisting of the spinal cord and trigeminal complex, posterior 
hypothalamus, periaqueductal gray, intralaminar nuclei and the ACC (Vogt & Sikes, 2000). The 
function of this system is to provide inputs to motor and premotor areas promoting avoidance 
behaviors (Sewards & Sewards, 2002b). According to RST, a neural Behavioral Inhibition 
System (BIS) responds to aversive stimuli and is thought to mediate avoidance behavior (Gray, 
1987; Gray & McNaughton, 2003; McNaughton & Corr, 2004). With overlapping areas with the 
pain/punishment systems described by current neuroscience, Gray suggested the BIS stems from 
several systems including noradrenergic and serotonergic pathways in the septohippocampal 
system and the amygdala (Depue & Iacono, 1989). Therefore, an overactive BIS may correspond 
to punishment sensitivity and avoidance-like behaviors.	
Evidence for the role of the ACC in the motivational aspect of pain is compelling. 
Lesions of the ACC consistently result in decreased subjective experience of pain and therefore, 
decreased avoidance behaviors (Johansen, Fields, & Manning, 2001; LaGraize, Labuda, 
Rutledge, Jackson, & Fuchs, 2004). Neuroimaging studies in humans also support the role of 
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ACC in pain perception, showing consistent activation of the ACC in response to aversive 
stimuli and pain expectation (Farrell, Laird, & Egan, 2005; Peyron, 2016; Rainville, Duncan, 
Price, Carrier, & Bushnell, 1997). The ACC has strong connections to several motor areas, 
supporting its role in avoidance behavior (Showers, 1959). Additionally, ACC neurons are 
activated during pain avoidance, specifically in the response phase (Koyama, Kato, & Mikami, 
2000; Koyama, Kato, Tanaka, & Mikami, 2001). 
The ACC has widespread connections to motor areas, including projections to facial 
nuclei responsible for moving muscles in the face that underlie the expression of negative 
emotions (Salomons, Coan, Hunt, Backonja, & Davidson, 2008). This suggests that ACC is not 
only involved in noxious stimuli processing, but is also a part of the pathway involved in 
negative emotionality that is associated with aversive stimuli (Cardinal et al., 2002). The 
connections between the amygdala, ventral striatum, and prefrontal cortex (limbic corticostriatal 
loop) might be responsible for estimating the value of a stimulus, an important aspect of emotion 
(Cardinal et al., 2002). In terms of prefrontal areas, the insular cortex is responsible for retrieval 
of value information pertaining to of food (often used as reinforcers or punishers; Balleine & 
Dickinson, 2000). The mPFC (and connections with the basolateral amygdala) are responsible 
for goal-directed behavior (Balleine & Dickinson, 1998; Coutureau, Dix, & Killcross, 2000), 
while the ACC monitors ongoing responses and corrects for violations in expectations of 
predicted stimuli (Falkenstein, Hohnsbein, Hoormann, & Blanke, 1991; Gehring, Goss, Coles, 
Meyer, & Donchin, 1993). The OFC and basolateral amygdala influence behavior by evaluating 
the emotional and motivational value of incoming stimuli (Holland, 1998), while the central 
nucleus of the amygdala controls brainstem responses such as arousal (Kapp, Whalen, Supple, & 
Pascoe, 1992). Last, the NAcc promotes behavior that is associated with rewarding outcomes, 
	 8 
especially rewarding outcomes that are associated with a delay (Cardinal, Pennicott, 
Sugathapala, Robbins, & Everitt, 2001). In this way, these areas can work together to contribute 
to the processing of negative emotions leading to avoidance behaviors. 
Risky Choice in Decision-Making	
 One way to study neural systems of decision-making is to measure the amount of risk 
within behavioral choice. A risky choice is characterized by possible negative outcomes (Beyth-
Marom, Austin, Fischhoff, Palmgren, & Jacobs-Quadrel, 1993; Boyer, 2006). Risky choice is 
more common in adolescence, though these behaviors may continue through adulthood and 
result in negative health outcomes, including heart disease and cancer (DiClemente, Hansen, & 
Ponton, 2013). Risk-taking behaviors (RTBs) such as alcohol and substance abuse, sexual risk-
taking, smoking, and gambling are commonly associated with impulsivity, which is 
characterized by increased sensitivity to rewards, decreased sensitivity to punishments, and 
perpetual risky choices (Evenden, 1999; Floden, Alexander, Kubu, Katz, & Stuss, 2008). 
Because of their association with reward and punishment sensitivity, risk-taking behaviors have 
been conceptually described as dysfunction within the two motivation systems of the brain: the 
appetitive system that encourages approach behavior and the aversive system that encourages 
avoidance behavior (Atkinson, 1957; Gray, 1987). One hypothesis stemming from RST suggests 
impulsive individuals have a hyperactive appetitive system or behavioral activation system 
(BAS; Corr, 2004; Gray, 1987). An extended version of this theory suggests impulsive 
individuals also have a hypoactive aversive system or behavioral inhibition system (BIS) 
resulting in sensitivity to rewards and insensitivity to punishments, respectively (Corr, 2002). 
The ACC’s specific role in the RST is unknown. However, one hypothesis is that the ACC is 
involved in conflict monitoring, i.e., it detects conflict among decisions, behaviors, and 
	 9 
cognitions and recruits higher order decision-making areas to resolve the conflict (Botvinick, 
2007). Therefore, the ACC could monitor conflict between both approach toward appetitive 
stimuli and avoidance of aversive stimuli by halting on-going behavior (Amodio, Master, Yee, & 
Taylor, 2008).  
The increased BAS, decreased BIS model has gained support not only from behavioral 
studies, but also from studies focused on clinical populations typically associated with risky 
decision-making. However, both sensitivity of the appetitive system and sensitivity of the 
aversive system together do not always predict RTBs. For example, in one study only self-
reported reward sensitivity predicted risky decisions on the Iowa Gambling Task, a task in which 
participants must choose from two types of decks: one that provides steady small rewards but 
yields an overall win and one that provides occasional high rewards but yields an overall loss 
(Franken & Muris, 2005). Similarly, Scott-Parker, Watson, King, and Hyde (2012) found 
reward sensitivity predicted risky drinking behaviors in young drivers. In another study though, 
both self-reported reward and punishment sensitivity significantly predicted externalizing 
behavior (Carlson, Pritchard, & Dominelli, 2013). In terms of clinical populations characterized 
by risky decision-making, individuals with oppositional defiant disorder showed the largest 
amount of insensitivity to punishment compared to attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder and 
controls on the Balloon Analogue Risk Task, a task where participants administer pumps to a 
balloon in order to gain money, with the chance of the balloon popping to lose all of the 
winnings, (Humphreys & Lee, 2011). Finally, one study found that reward sensitivity was 
associated with disordered eating and drinking, while punishment sensitivity was only related to 
disordered eating (Loxton & Dawe, 2006). These results suggest that reward and punishment 
processing are distinct constructs and can contribute to decision-making in different ways 
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(Torrubia, Avila, Moltó, & Caseras, 2001). However, there is debate over whether the neural 
substrates of reward and punishment are distinct (Hayes, Duncan, Xu, & Northoff, 2014). 
Because the ACC receives input from both reward and punishment areas, it is possible that at 
some point in the process, these pathways converge. This would support a model that allows 
reward and punishment sensitivity to correlate, which has also been suggested in the literature 
(Sava & Sperneac, 2006). Most conceptual models have been tested using self-report methods. 
Expanding these models to include the neural underpinnings of both of these pathways can better 
our understanding of decision-making processes. 
Motivation Systems and Risky Choice 
Some research has investigated the role of the motivational systems in decision-making 
through the study of risky choice. Individuals with lesions in the appetitive system (specifically, 
areas within the MFC) have difficulty making decisions, suggesting reward expectation violation 
has a significant impact on decision-making processes. For example, on the Iowa Gambling 
Task, patients with ventromedial prefrontal cortex damage continuously pick from the decks that 
produce occasional high rewards, but yield an overall loss (Bechara, Damasio, Damasio, & 
Anderson, 1994; Bechara, Tranel, & Damasio, 2000). In addition, transcranial altering current 
stimulation to the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex resulted in riskier decision-making on the 
Balloon Analogue Risk Task (Sela, Kilim, & Lavidor, 2012). Similarly in rats, those with 
orbitofrontal lesions showed preference for smaller immediate rewards and smaller definite 
rewards compared with larger delayed and larger probable rewards (Mobini et al., 2002). 
Individuals without lesions, but with impulsivity or substance dependence display a similar 
behavior, picking from risky decks on the Iowa Gambling Task (Bechara, 2003; Bechara & 
Damasio, 2002). Lesions to the ACC lead to impaired decision-making due to diminished set-
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shifting ability on the Wisconsin Card Sorting Task, a task where the patient must learn rules in 
order to sort cards, and riskier choices on the Iowa Gambling Task (Gläscher et al., 2012).	
 It is already clear that damage to the ACC can lead to risk-taking behaviors; however, as 
the ACC is a direct target of both the reward and punishment systems, it is unknown if this is due 
to the inability to process rewards or the inability to process pain. Thus far, most studies on pain 
perception/avoidance and RTBs have relied on self-report measures rather than implementing 
behavioral or physiological tasks; however, there is some research that links RTB and the pain 
system. For example, one specific theory of alcohol abuse suggests that individuals may engage 
in increased alcohol use to avoid negative stimuli or negative internal states (Baker, Piper, 
McCarthy, Majeskie, & Fiore, 2004; Cooper, Frone, Russell, & Mudar, 1995). Thus an increased 
response to aversive stimuli may be related to high RTB in terms of alcohol use. On the other 
hand, anxiety, which is often associated with a heightened response to punishment, is typically 
associated with extremely low levels of RTB (Maner et al., 2007). This suggests that increased 
sensitivity to aversive stimuli may also be related to low levels of RTB. One of few studies on 
RTB and pain reported that self-reported anxiety was associated with lower-risk choices while 
self-reported intolerance to uncertainty was associated with choosing to pass over a gamble to 
avoid risk (Macatee et al., 2015). Although the direct connection between the pain system and 
RTBs is unknown, these findings support the possibility that the punishment system has a 
distinct impact on decision-making.	
ERP Indices of Motivational Prediction Errors	
Event-related potential (ERP) studies have contributed to the large body of research on 
reward and punishment outcome processing. The original studies of outcome processing began 
with the Error-Related Negativity (ERN), which is a negative deflection that occurs 0-150 ms 
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following behavioral errors (Falkenstein et al., 1991; Gehring et al., 1993). Typically observed in 
speeded reaction time tasks, the ERN is conceptualized to represent error detection/compensation 
and has been source localized to the ACC, an area described above as an important projection of 
the DA reward system (Dehaene, Posner, & Tucker, 1994). A related component, the Feedback-
Related Negativity (FRN), is a similar negative-going deflection that occurs after negative 
feedback (Miltner, Braun, & Coles, 1997) or losses on gambling tasks (Gehring & Willoughby, 
2002) when the participant is not originally aware of the error. Similar to the ERN, the FRN has 
been source localized to the ACC and is considered the same component under differing eliciting 
conditions (Potts, Martin, Kamp, & Donchin, 2011).	
 The dominant theory, Reinforcement Learning Theory of the ERN/FRN proposed by 
Holroyd and Coles (2002) postulates that these components reflect a reward prediction error 
(RPE) signal from the VTA to the ACC. Similar to DA neurons in monkeys, the FRN is most 
positive to unexpected rewards (sometimes referred to as the Reward Positivity [RewP]), most 
negative to unexpected withheld rewards, and no different to outcomes that are fully predicted 
(Potts, Martin, Burton, & Montague, 2006; Proudfit, 2015). In this way, ACC responses are 
suggested to represent outcomes that are better or worse than expected. As such, the FRN is 
sensitive to valence: negative outcomes elicit a more negative wave than positive outcomes 
(Miltner et al., 1997). The FRN is sensitive to magnitude: the difference between a small win and 
a small loss is smaller than the difference between large wins and large losses (Goyer, Woldorff, 
& Huettel, 2008). The FRN is sensitive to probability: smaller probabilities elicit a larger 
difference between wins and losses, while larger probabilities elicit a smaller difference between 
wins and losses (Pfabigan, Alexopoulos, Bauer, & Sailer, 2011; Walsh & Anderson, 2012). The 
FRN predicts learning and behavioral adjustment: a larger FRN is associated with better learning 
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of outcomes (Cohen & Ranganath, 2007). An updated theory suggests that multiple components 
make up the FRN response, including a typical response-conflict N200 that occurs to all 
unexpected stimuli and a RewP that occurs to rewarding stimuli (Holroyd, Pakzad-Vaezi, & 
Krigolson, 2008). While there is still some debate on whether or not these components actually 
represent a reward prediction error, a major meta-analysis largely found evidence in support of 
this model (Sambrook & Goslin, 2015).	
 Evidence has shown that the FRN is not only present when an active choice is made, but 
it is also present during observational learning. This suggests that reward learning still occurs 
under simple outcome processing (with no choice). For example, van Schie, Mars, Coles, and 
Bekkering (2004) compared ERP responses in two conditions: one where the participants 
executed the task themselves, and one where they observed the task being executed. They found 
similar medial frontal activity, the ERN, in both conditions; however, the ERN appeared shifted 
in time, more similar to the FRN in the observational condition. Other studies have found that 
passive tasks elicit a comparable FRN to active tasks, but that in observational conditions, the 
FRN is slightly reduced (Fukushima & Hiraki, 2009; Itagaki & Katayama, 2008; Martin, Potts, 
Burton, & Montague, 2009). The passive/no choice designs signify a pure assessment of neural 
reward and punishment sensitivity and can be used to measure simple reward system outcome 
processing. On the other hand, the active decision-making tasks represent the response of these 
systems under cognitive challenge.	
Physiological studies looking at the ERN or FRN in decision-making support the role of 
the appetitive system in decision-making. For instance, when rewards are large, both self-
reported impulsives and controls show a typical RewP/FRN response in a passive slot-machine 
task, but when rewards are small, only the impulsives show the RewP and FRN response (Martin 
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& Potts, 2004). Additionally, only low impulsive individuals show a larger FRN response 
following risky choices (Martin & Potts, 2009). Similarly, in a sample of smokers, a larger 
positivity is observed to unexpected rewards, but this response is not observed in a non-smoking 
sample, suggesting smokers are more sensitive to unexpected rewards (Potts, Bloom, Evans, & 
Drobes, 2014).	
ERP studies also support the role of the aversive system in decision-making (Nelson, 
Patrick, & Bernat, 2011; Olvet & Hajcak, 2008). For example, self-reported impulsive 
individuals have a decreased ERN on punishment-motivated trials, but not reward-motivated 
trials on a flanker task, suggesting insensitivity to errors related to punishments (Potts, George, 
Martin, & Barratt, 2006). Individuals who score high on self-reported externalizing (a 
personality trait typically associated with risk-taking) also have smaller ERN amplitudes (Hall, 
Bernat, & Patrick, 2007). In addition to self-reported personality traits, those at risk for substance 
use disorders also display a reduced reaction to monetary loss. For example, smaller FRNs were 
seen in individuals with a greater family history of alcohol abuse (Fein & Chang, 2008). 
Likewise, adolescents that had been exposed to cocaine and other drugs prenatally displayed a 
reduced FRN to rewards that were delivered after a delay (Crowley et al., 2009). In one study 
performed in our lab, increased frequency of alcohol use was associated with less negative FRNs 
to unexpected withheld rewards, suggesting that alcohol users are more likely to ignore the 
negative outcomes of their choices (unpublished work, Soder & Potts 2015).	
Although we have demonstrated that individual differences within the appetitive (BAS) 
and aversive (BIS) systems can contribute to risky choice indecision-making through ERPs 
(using the absence of an appetitive stimulus as a punishment), little is known about the FRN 
response to aversive outcomes other than monetary loss. Given that monetary loss represents the 
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absence of an appetitive stimulus, previous ERP studies may have only indexed the BAS and 
may not have directly indexed the BIS. In order to truly test the RST model of risk-taking, one 
would need to measure the ERP response to the presence of an aversive stimulus. Given the 
current model of the FRN (the RPE theory), one would expect outcomes that are better than 
expected to elicit the most positive wave and outcomes that are worse than expected to elicit the 
most negative wave, including the presence of an aversive outcome, such as electric shock. 
Recent evidence suggests that this is not what we observe. In fact, the first FRN study to employ 
positive punishment (i.e., electric shock) to participants found that the FRN was enhanced (most 
negative) to unexpected withheld punishments, rather than unexpected delivered punishments, 
indexing the better than expected outcome rather than the worse than expected outcome (Talmi, 
Atkinson, & El-Deredy, 2013). While in contrast to the main RPE theory, these authors 
suggested that the FRN represents a salience prediction error (SPE), where more negative FRNs 
were related to the absence of a salient stimulus, rather than the presence of that stimulus, 
regardless of valence. This study revealed that it is likely the ACC does not only engage the 
reward system, but it may also engage the separate, punishment system, which can be measured 
through the FRN response. Specifically, the FRN can measure both BIS (presence and absence 
of an aversive stimulus) and BAS (presence and absence of an appetitive stimulus).	
Current Study	
Although most research supports the main model of the two separate appetitive and 
aversive systems, one main issue is evident. Most of those studies either employed monetary loss 
as a punishment or relied on self-report measures of punishment-sensitivity as an index of the 
aversive system. While it is certain that losing money is a negatively valenced outcome that is 
associated with negative emotions, it represents the absence of an appetitive stimulus (i.e., 
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money), which is likely processed in the projection from the VTA to the ACC (DA reward 
system). On the other hand, the presence/absence of aversive stimuli is likely processed in the 
projections from the medial pain system, the emotional system of the corticostriatal loop, or the 
septohippocampal system to the ACC and may not be responsible for processing non-rewards. 
Therefore it is possible that measuring punishment through monetary loss only engages the 
appetitive system rather than the actual aversive system. Thus, it is unknown if risky decision-
making is a result of insensitivity to all negative outcomes in general or just an insensitivity to 
the lack of appetitive outcomes (i.e., money). The current proposal seeks to measure individual 
differences in the functioning of both appetitive and aversive systems to test their predictive 
ability on decision-making. In order to do so, the current study will combine self-report measures 
of reward sensitivity as well as ERPs in response to a reward (monetary) task and combine self-
report measures of punishment sensitivity as well as ERPs in response to a punishment (loud 
noise burst) task in order to directly measure the BIS/BAS. In addition, these measures of 
BIS/BAS will be used to predict the amount of risk within decision-making.	
The first step is to determine if expectation violation of both rewarding appetitive and 
punishing aversive events engage a similar outcome processing area: anterior cingulate cortex. 
Experiment 1 will address this question by comparing a clean, passive reward prediction task, 
already known to engage the ACC and represent a reward prediction error, to an identical passive 
punishment prediction task. The next step is to determine if individual differences in expectation 
violation (i.e., appetitive and aversive system functioning) have an impact on decision-making. 
Experiment 2 will address this question by employing a risky decision-making task within both 
rewarding appetitive and punishing aversive domains. If rewards and punishments are truly 
processed in these two separate appetitive and aversive systems, then ERP responses, along with 
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self-reported BIS/BAS function, should load onto two separate appetitive and aversive system 
latent variables. Additionally, these latent variables should be predictive of risk-taking on the 
behavioral task as well as self-reported risk-taking.	
Specific Aims	
Aim 1: Both punishment and reward prediction errors will activate ACC. [Experiment 1]	
H1a: The unpredicted presence of a reward and the unpredicted presence of a punishment 
will elicit a medial prefrontal positivity (RewP) between 200 – 300 ms post stimulus.	
H1b: The unpredicted absence of a reward and the unpredicted absence of a punishment 
will elicit a medial prefrontal negativity (FRN) between 250 – 350 ms post stimulus.	
Aim 2: Reward and punishment sensitivity are separate but correlated constructs that can be 
measured by neural activity and self-reported personality traits. [Experiment 2]	
 H2a: Using confirmatory factor analysis, the FRN on the monetary gambling task, scores 
on the BIS-11, and scores on the SPSRQR will all load onto a similar “Appetitive System” latent 
variable.	
 H2b: Using confirmatory factor analysis, the FRN on the noise gambling task, scores on 
the STAI, and scores on the SPSRQP will all load onto a similar “Aversive System” latent 
variable.	
Aim 3: Latent variables, appetitive and aversive systems, will predict risk-taking behavior. 
[Experiment 2]	
 H4a: Latent variables, appetitive and aversive systems, as constructed by CFA will 
predict self-reported externalizing and task behavior using SEM.		
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EXPERIMENT 1	
Method 
Participants	
58 undergraduate participants were recruited via the University of South Florida 
Department of Psychology subject pool. Eligible participants were English-speaking with 
reportedly intact hearing and no hearing correction device, no current treatment or 
hospitalization for psychiatric disorders, and no reported psychotropic drug use. 2 participants 
were excluded due to excessive EEG artifact, while 6 others were excluded due to unsuccessful 
manipulation (i.e., they rated the white noise burst as ‘pleasant’ on stimulus validation check), 
leaving 50 participants in the final sample. The sample was 78% female with an average age of 
20.94 (SD = 4.7). Compensation for assessment included a portion of monetary winnings from 
the reward motivated task (up to $10) and course credit. The University of South Florida IRB 
approved all study protocols.	
Experimental Design	
Tasks. Participants completed two computer tasks: the Reward Prediction Task (RPT), an 
S1/S2 passive design employing the predicted and unpredicted delivery and withholding of 
monetary rewards from Potts, Martin, et al. (2006) and the Punishment Prediction Task (PPT), an 
adapted version of the RPT that used the delivery and withholding of aversive white noise bursts 
instead of money as the outcomes. In the RPT, S1 and S2 were images of lemons and gold bars. 
S1 was the same as S2 80% of the time and S2 determined the outcome 100% of the time. If S2 
was a lemon the outcome was $0 and if S2 was a gold bar the outcome was a $1 gain 
	 19 
(additionally, each trial cost $0.25 to play, so an S2 lemon netted a $0.25 loss and S2 gold bar 
netted a $0.75 gain); in turn, 20% of the time participants received an unexpectedly delivered 
reward (UR) or an unexpectedly withheld reward (UNR), and 80% of the time they received 
predicted rewards (PR) or withheld rewards (PNR). Following S2 a running total of the 
participant’s winnings was displayed in the middle of the screen while a cash sound was played 
if the trial was rewarding. If the trial was not rewarding, then no noise was played, just the 
running total (see Figure1 for an example trial). The outcome screen was followed by a screen 
that read, “Please press a key to continue” until the participant pressed a key to initiate the next 
trial. The experiment continued after two seconds if no button press occurred. Participants were 
fully informed of the trial structure and stimulus outcomes at the beginning of the experiment 
and had several practice trials before starting.	
For the PPT the same percentages were used to predict punishment via white noise burst, 
and the predicting stimuli were either punishing (lightning bolt) or not punishing (cloud), where 
a lightning bolt in the S2 position returned a 1 second burst of white noise and a cloud in the S2 
position returned silence. 20% of the time participants received an unexpected punishment (UP) 
or an unexpected withheld punishment (UNP), and 80% of the time they received predicted 
punishments (PP) or withheld punishments (PNP). A speaker was displayed if the trial was 
punishing, while the white noise burst was played and a speaker with a slash through it was 
displayed if the trial was not punishing (Figure 1). Participants were fully aware of the trial 
structure and completed practice trials before starting.	
Manipulation Check. The Self Assessment Mannequin (SAM) from Bradley and Lang 
(1994) was used to assess subjective pleasantness/arousal ratings of the auditory cash reward 
indicator and the white noise bursts. The SAM depicts a robot that consists of 5 pictures of 
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valence (1-sad – 5-happy) and 5 pictures of arousal (1-weak – 5-strong). Participants selected the 
valence and arousal of how they felt about the white noise burst and cash sound after each block.	
Demographic Survey. Participants completed a brief demographic survey online via 
Qualtrics. The survey assessed age, gender, and handedness, as well as family history of mental 
health diagnoses and drug abuse.  	
Equipment	
 EEG Acquisition/Analysis. Electroencephalographic data was acquired through 128-
electrode Geodesic Sensor Nets (EGI, Eugene) at a sampling rate of 250 Hz referenced to the 
vertex with .1-100 Hz analog filtering. The EEG was digitally filtered offline at 20 Hz, and 
segmented into 1000-ms epochs from 200-ms before to 800-ms after S2 onset. Epochs were 
screened for artifacts (e.g., eye blinks and movement, participant motion) using EGI Netstation 
artifact detection tool, and artifact free epochs were sorted by condition and averaged to create 
the ERPs. Conditions for the RPT were unpredicted reward, unpredicted non-reward, predicted 
reward, and predicted non-reward. Conditions for the PPT were unpredicted punishment, 
unpredicted non-punishment, predicted punishment and unpredicted non-punishment. Average 
ERPs were then baseline corrected over the 200 ms pre-stimulus period and re-referenced to the 
average reference. Individual ERPs were averaged across all subjects to create the grand average. 
Grand average plots are displayed over a region of interest (ROI) selected from the scalp 
topographies (Figure 3). The ROI included electrodes 4, 5, 6, 11, 12, 19, 20, 118 and the 
electrode map is displayed in Figure 2.	
Auditory Device. All sounds were presented through PreSonus Audiobox USB. 
Participants were fitted for foam eartips from E-A-RLINK through insert tube headphones. 
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White noise bursts were played at ~90 db (measured by Bruel and Kjaer meter type 2250). All 
other sounds were played at ~75 dBs	
Procedure	
After online screening for inclusion and exclusion criteria, participants signed up for a 
date to enter the lab. Upon arrival, participants gave informed consent, were given a tour of the 
lab, and were fitted for an EEG net. Each participant completed 4 blocks of the experiment: two 
blocks of each task (RPT, PPT) consisting of 240 trials each, with block order randomly assigned 
and counterbalanced across subjects. Participants completed an online demographic form either 
before or after the computer tasks (order randomized across participants). Participants completed 
practice trials for the first block of each motivation condition. Upon completion of the computer 
tasks, participants rolled a die to see which block of the RPT they would be paid for. The 
manipulation check was completed between each block.	
Analyses	
Manipulation Check. Paired-samples t-tests were performed to check for differences 
between the SAM sound ratings of the white noise bursts and cash sounds.	
Within Design Effects. To determine the RewP/FRN response to S2 onset, we derived 
mean amplitude measures for each participant per condition. The analysis windows were 
determined by constructing a 50-ms window around the average peak latency determined by the 
grand average waveforms. However, because visual inspection revealed there were two obvious 
peaks with similar scalp topography, we used two separate time windows to determine mean 
amplitude, 170-220ms and 245-295ms (Figure 2). We tested for within design effects on mean 
amplitude in each window using 2x2 reward or punishment delivery (delivered, withheld) by 
prediction (predicted, unpredicted) repeated-measures ANOVAs. Differences between specific 
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conditions within significant interactions were tested with paired samples t-tests. To determine if 
exposure to the RPT or PPT first had an effect on ERP amplitude, we included the order of tasks 
as a between subjects factor.	
Between Design Effects. Better-than-expected and worse-than-expected difference waves 
were created for each task holding S1 constant in each subtraction (Potts, Martin, et al., 2006). In 
the RPT, this reflected unpredicted reward (S1:lemon-S2:bar) minus predicted non-reward 
(S1:lemon-S2:lemon) and unpredicted non-reward (S1:bar-S2:lemon; worse-than-expected) 
minus predicted reward (S1:bar-S2:bar). In the PPT, this reflected unpredicted non-punishment 
(S1:lightning-S2:cloud) minus predicted punishment (S1:lightning-S2:lightning) and unpredicted 
punishment (S1:cloud-S2:lightning; worse-than-expected) minus predicted non-punishment 
(S1:cloud-S2:cloud). Mean amplitudes and latencies of the positive and negative peaks were 
extracted from a single time-window of 180-290-ms for all difference waves. Between-design 
effects were tested using a 2x2 repeated-measures ANOVA for difference wave latencies of 
design (RPT, PPT) and delivery (delivered, withheld). 
Results 
Sound Ratings 
 Participants rated the white noise burst (M = 2.01, SD = .71) sound as more unpleasant 
than the cash (M = 3.78 SD = .69) sound (t(49) = -11.21, p < .001, d =2.49) and reported higher 
arousal rates to the white noise burst (M = 3.67, SD = .91) sound than the cash (M = 2.48, SD = 
.85) sound (t(49) = 9.02, p < .001, d = 1.24). Sound ratings were unrelated to any of the ERPs. 
Reward Prediction Task 
 Early Window (170-220 ms). ERPs to unexpected conditions were more positive than 
expected conditions (F(1,49) = 14.57, p < .001, ηp2 = .23), but there was no significant main 
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effect of delivery (F(1,49) =.61, p = .44, ηp2 = .01) or interaction effect of delivery and 
expectation (F(1,49) = 1.38 p = .25, ηp2 = .03). We performed a priori paired samples t-tests to 
compare means between conditions to verify that unexpected reward was the most positive wave 
in this time window. As hypothesized, unexpected reward was the most positive wave and 
differed from expected reward (t(49) = 2.96, p = .005, d = .33) and expected non-reward (t(49) = 
2.39, p = .021, d = .33). However, unexpected reward and unexpected non-reward were not 
significantly different (t(49) = 1.16, p = .25, d = .16). As predicted, the expected conditions did 
not differ from one another (t(49) = -.27, p = .79, d = .03). 
 Late Window (245-295 ms). ERPs to delivered rewards were more positive than to 
withheld rewards (F(1,49) = 14.86, p < .001, ηp2 = .23), while there was no main effect for 
expectation (F(1,49) = 1.56, p = .22, ηp2 = .03). There was an interaction between expectation 
and reward delivery (F(1,49) = 9.94, p = .003, ηp2 = .17), with the difference between delivered 
reward and withheld reward larger for unexpected conditions. Paired samples t-tests showed that 
unexpected delivered rewards were more positive than unexpected withheld rewards (t(49) = 
3.89, p < .001, d = .56), but were not different from expected delivered rewards (t(49) = 1.38, p 
=.173, d = .19) or expected withheld rewards (t(49) = 1.88, p = .07, d = .30). Unexpected 
withheld rewards elicited the most negative wave and were significantly different from all 
conditions, including expected delivered rewards (t(49) = -3.80, p < .001, d = .52) and expected 
withheld rewards (t(49) = -2.89, p = .006, d = .42). Similar to the early window, expected 
conditions did not differ from one another (t(49) = 1.23, p =.226, d = .14). See Figure 2A for 
waveforms and Figure 3 for scalp topographies. 
 Order Effects. Order of tasks was also entered in the ANOVA for both time windows. 
There was a main effect of order in the early time window, where exposure to the PPT first 
	 24 
resulted in more positive amplitudes on the RPT (F(1,49) = 6.64, p = .013, ηp2 = .12). Order did 
not interact with prediction or reward (p’s < .05). In the late time window, there was no effect of 
task order (p’s < .05).  
Punishment Prediction Task	
 Early Window (170-220 ms). ERPs were more positive to delivered punishments 
compared with withheld punishments (F(1,49) = 7.58, p = .008, ηp2 = .13) and more positive to 
unexpected conditions compared with expected conditions (F(1,49) = 26.06, p < .001, ηp2 = .35). 
The interaction between punishment delivery and prediction revealed a non-significant trend 
(F(1,49) = 2.62, p = .10, ηp2 = .06). T-tests to contrast with the RPT and examine the apparent 
positivity to unexpectedly delivered punishments suggested that unexpected delivered 
punishments elicited the most positive wave and differed from all other conditions including 
unexpected withheld punishments (t(49) = 2.56, p = .014, d = .37), expected delivered 
punishments (t(49) = 4.37, p < .001, d = .60) and expected withheld punishments (t(49) = .5.22, 
p < .001, d = .68). On the other hand, unexpected withheld punishments elicited the most 
negative wave and differed significantly from expected delivered punishments (t(49) = 2.73, p = 
.000, d = .24); however, the difference between unexpected withheld punishments and expected 
withheld punishments did not reach significance (t(49) = 1.58, p < .12, d = .34). Similar to the 
reward motivated task, the expected conditions did not differ from one another (t(49) = 1.24, p = 
.22, d = .14).  
 Late Window (245-295 ms). The late window revealed a significant main effect for 
delivered versus withheld punishments (F(1,49) = 47.47, p < .001, ηp2 = .49), where delivered 
punishments were more positive than withheld ones. A main effect for prediction was also 
significant (F(1,49) = 13.16, p = .001, ηp2 = .21), where expected conditions were more positive 
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than unexpected conditions. There was also a significant interaction that showed the difference 
between delivered and withheld punishments was larger for unexpected conditions (F(1,49) = 
11.84, p = .001, ηp2 = .20). Comparisons showed that unexpected delivered punishments elicited 
the most positive wave and differed significantly from unexpected withheld punishments (t(49) = 
5.90, p < .001, d = .27) and expected withheld punishments (t(49) = 2.52, p = .02, d = .45); 
however, the difference between unexpected delivered punishments and expected delivered 
punishments did not reach significance (t(49) = .89, p = .38, d = .16). Unexpected withheld 
punishments elicited the most negative wave and differed significantly from both expected 
delivered punishments (t(49) = 6.4, p < .000, d = .1.10) and withheld punishments (t(49) = 4.54, 
p < .000, d = .68). Similar to the early window, the expected conditions were significantly 
different from each other (t(49) = 5.17, p < .001, d = .69). See Figure 2B for waveforms. 
 Order Effects. There was a significant interaction between task order and prediction 
(F(1,48) = 5.17, p = .027, ηp2 = .10). Specifically, those who were exposed to PPT first had a 
larger difference between unpredicted and predicted conditions, where unpredicted conditions 
were more positive than predicted conditions (EMD = 1.02, p < .001, 95% CI [.63, 1.4]). Like 
the RPT, there was no effect of order on the late time window for the PPT (p’s < .05). 
Discussion 1 
Experiment 1 provided evidence in support of Aim 1: The ACC generated a similar 
prediction error in both the RPT and the PPT. The prediction error represented the upcoming 
delivery or withholding of a motivationally salient outcome rather than the valence of that 
outcome. Specifically, during the RPT, there was an FRN-like negativity when participants 
expected a reward of $1 but later found out that the reward would be withheld. Alternatively, a 
small positivity was observed over the MFC when participants expected no reward but found out 
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that they would receive one. There were identical results on the PPT. An FRN-like negativity 
was exhibited over the MFC when participants expected a loud noise burst but later found out 
that the noise would be withheld. Alternatively, a large positivity (larger than in the RPT) was 
observed over the MFC when participants expected no noise, but then later found out that they 
would receive one. Notably, there were order effects that may have contributed to the larger, 
significant positivity on the PPT compared to the RPT. Those who completed the punishment 
task first had larger positivities to unpredicted conditions in the early time window, an effect that 
was not found for the RPT. These results suggest that the ACC is involved in the processing of 
both appetitive stimuli and aversive stimuli. While the results were in support of Aim 1, they are 
descriptive in nature and may reflect several possible underlying processes. 
First, the ACC may receive distinct reward prediction error and punishment prediction 
error signals from differential neural systems (e.g., different catecholamine systems; Daw, 
Kakade, & Dayan, 2002). This is consistent with previous research on the FRN that has reported 
differential coding of probability and magnitude between gain and loss domains (Cohen, Elger, 
& Ranganath, 2007; Deng, Yu, Chen, & Wang, 2012; San Martin, Manes, Hurtado, Isla, & 
Ibanez, 2010). It is possible the ACC receives a reward prediction signal from the dopamine 
reward system for feedback employing appetitive outcomes, while feedback employing aversive 
outcomes produces a punishment prediction error from a different neural system. The ACC has 
connections with a number of subcortical regions, including the spinothalamic system (Dum, 
Levinthal, & Strick, 2009) and the lateral basal nucleus of the amygdala (Morecraft et al., 2007; 
Roy et al., 2009). These areas are responsible for nociception and fear learning, respectively, and 
might generate a punishment prediction signal to the ACC and subsequent ERPs observed in the 
punishment prediction task. 
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Alternatively, the ACC could integrate information from both appetitive and aversive 
systems with motor and perceptual information to take action or update decision criteria. Recent 
theories suggest an overall integrative role of the ACC concerning cognitive control ('adaptive 
control hypothesis' and 'expected value of control'; Shackman et al., 2011; Shenhav et al., 2013). 
A recent voxel-by-voxel meta-analysis of brain imaging studies by Shackman et al. (2011) 
revealed a large cluster in the dorsal ACC (dACC) of overlap between studies of negative affect, 
pain, and cognitive control. These authors suggest that dACC uses information about punishment 
to motivate goal-directed behavior and adaptively activate the proper motor areas responsible for 
facial expressions related to emotions. Although this theory only included punishment and 
negative affect, other accounts have expanded this model to include the evaluation of rewards 
(Shenhav et al., 2013). The ACC is responsible for integrating information about payoff, amount 
of control and costs to determine whether or not the amount of control needed is worth the effort. 
Specifically for allocation of cognitive control, the absence or presence of an expected event may 
be more important in determining the costs of an action, while information on the valence of that 
event might be less useful. 
Another possibility is that the medial frontal ERP response observed in this study solely 
reflects dopamine input from the midbrain and no other pain or punishment pathways. Consistent 
with recent evidence that at least one group of midbrain dopamine neurons increases firing to 
both rewards and punishments (Frank & Surmeier, 2009; Matsumoto & Hikosaka, 2009), this 
study observed a positivity to the stimulus predicting both unexpected rewards and unexpected 
punishments (representing an increase in dopamine), with a negativity to the stimulus predicting 
unexpected withheld rewards and punishments (representing a decrease in dopamine). The ACC 
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might use information about the delivery of rewards and punishments from the DA system to 
help evaluate plans for future action. 
These results are consistent with a recent account of MFC functioning: the Predicted 
Response Outcome Model (PRO model; Alexander & Brown, 2011). The PRO model proposes 
that the MFC is responsible for predicting action-outcome contingencies and updating these 
contingencies when unexpected events occur. The MFC is maximally engaged when an outcome 
is unexpectedly withheld and inhibited when expected outcomes occur. Thus the MFC responds 
to the unexpected “non-occurrence” of an important stimulus (Alexander & Brown, 2011). 
Supporting the PRO model, other studies that measured the effect of aversive stimuli on the FRN 
reported similar results to these: an FRN-like negativity to the unexpected withholding of both an 
appetitive and an aversive outcome (Hird, El-Deredy, Jones, & Talmi, 2017; Talmi et al., 2013). 
Additionally, fMRI and single cell studies have also reported activation of the MFC to surprising 
events (Garofalo, Maier, & di Pellegrino, 2014; Matsumoto, Matsumoto, Abe, & Tanaka, 2007; 
Wessel, Danielmeier, Morton, & Ullsperger, 2012). One inconsistency between these results and 
others is that in this study, the brain response distinguished between types of unexpected events 
(unexpectedly delivered versus unexpectedly withheld) whereas other studies reported similar 
activity to all surprising events. These inconsistencies might provide a starting point for future 
studies. 
Notably, Experiment 1 employed a passive task where participants’ only job was to 
initiate the next trial, similar to a slot machine. While previous studies have reported prediction 
errors in passive tasks before (Potts, Martin, et al., 2006; Soder, de Dios, & Potts, 2016; Talmi et 
al., 2013), both Reinforcement Learning Theory and the PRO model describe how prediction 
errors are important for decision-making (Alexander & Brown, 2011; Holroyd & Coles, 2002). 
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Support for these models comes from active studies where participants must make a choice. 
Therefore, it is possible that the results presented in this experiment reflect separate processes 
than those described by these models. Additionally, in order for an outcome to be “punishing”, 
the outcome must decrease a behavior. As there was no behavior to measure in this task, it was 
impossible to show that the white noise burst was punishing. Future studies could look to 
measure the effect of appetitive versus aversive stimuli in a decision-making task on the FRN. 
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EXPERIMENT 2	
Method	
Participants	
 134 participants were recruited from the University of South Florida psychology 
participant pool (SONA). Participants were screened for normal or corrected-to-normal vision 
and English. Exclusion criteria included: treatment for a psychiatric disorder or hospitalization 
for psychiatric reasons, medication that affects thinking, and use of a hearing device or anything 
that might block the ear canal due to the head phone device used in the experiment. Participants 
received extra credit as well as a portion of their winnings from the monetary gambling task.	
Measures	
Demographics 
A brief demographic form was used to collect information on the following variables: 
age, gender, year in college, handedness, race, ethnicity, socioeconomic status, family and 
current history of mental disorders and substance abuse. Select demographic information is 
provided in Table 1.	
Self-Reported Appetitive System Function	
Barratt Impulsiveness Scale Version 11 (BIS11; Patton, Stanford, & Barratt, 1995). The 
BIS-11 will be used as one measure of the appetitive system, specifically of impulsivity (IMP). 
The BIS-11 consists of 30 items, e.g. “I act on the spur of the moment”, “I am more interested in 
the present than the future”, “I “squirm” at plays or lectures” that participants answer from 1 = 
	 31 
rarely/never to 4 = almost always (inventory contains reverse-scored items). Thus scores 
potentially range from 30 – 120. Scale information is provided in Table 2.	
Sensitivity to Punishment and Sensitivity to Reward Questionnaire (SPSRQ; Torrubia et 
al., 2001). The sensitivity to reward subscale will be used as an alternative appetitive system 
measure, specifically as a measure of reward sensitivity (SR). The reward subscale includes 24 
items in which participants must respond with either “yes” or “no”. A total score is derived from 
a sum of the reward related items. Scale information is provided in Table 2.	
Self-Reported Aversive System Function	
State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI; Spielberger, 1983). The STAI is a measure of both 
state and trait anxiety. The form includes 20 self-evaluation questions pertaining to the 
participant’s current state and 20 questions pertaining to trait-based anxiety. Participants must 
select from 1 = not at all to 4 = very much so for each statement. The sum of the responses are 
totaled separately for both state and trait anxiety and only trait anxiety was used as our measure 
of anxiety (ANX). Scale information is provided in Table 2.	
Sensitivity to Punishment and Sensitivity to Reward Questionnaire (SPSRQ; Torrubia et 
al., 2001). The sensitivity to punishment subscale will be used as an alternative measurement of 
the aversive system. The punishment subscale includes 24 items in which participants must 
respond with either “yes” or “no”. A total score is derived from a sum of the punishment related 
items.	
Self-Reported Risky Decision-Making	
Externalizing Spectrum Inventory – Brief Form (ESI-BF; Krueger, Markon, Patrick, 
Benning, & Kramer, 2007; Patrick, Kramer, Krueger, & Markon, 2013). The ESI-BF will be 
used as a measure of self-reported risk-taking, specifically externalizing behavior (EXT). It 
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includes 160 items in which participants must circle the choice (i.e., true, somewhat true, 
somewhat false, or false) that describes them most. The scale has several subscales, but the total 
score will be used to measure overall risk-taking and externalizing behaviors. Scale information 
is provided in Table 2.	
ERP Indices of Appetitive and Aversive System Function and Behavioral Risky 
Choice	
 A novel monetary gambling task (MGT) was used to measure neural motivational 
prediction errors of the appetitive and aversive systems and risky decision-making (modeled 
after; Studer & Clark, 2011). Each trial consisted of three stages: betting, feedback, and outcome 
(Figure 4). Starting with $5 in the bank, during the betting phase, two boxes with two different 
bet choices ($0.05, $0.10) were displayed on the bottom of the screen. A large circle was 
displayed in the center of the screen indicating the probability of winning (30%, 40% 50%, 60%, 
or 70%). After the participant placed their bet, the bet boxes disappeared, replaced by a fixation. 
Feedback was then provided in the center of the screen: either a large blue circle with “YOU 
WON!” on the bottom or a large red circle with “YOU LOST”. If the participant won the bet, the 
money was added to their total and if the participant lost the bet, the money was subtracted from 
the total. The amount won or lost was displayed in the center of the screen in the outcome stage. 
A speaker was also displayed in the bottom right corner along with either a winning noise, e.g., 
“cha-ching” or a losing noise, e.g., “beep, beep”. On bonus trials, participants were able to 
double their bet (this was set to only occur on winning trials without the participants’ 
knowledge). Participants were also not aware during the betting phase that the trial was a bonus 
trial. These trials were included to promote higher bets on trials with a low probability of 
winning. Participants received winnings from one block of the experiment (determined via dice 
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roll) and were told that if their total goes under $5, they would receive the original $5 they 
started out with	
 The participants also completed a punishment-motivated version of the same task, which 
will be referred to as the noise gambling task (NGT). Like the monetary version, there was a 
betting, feedback, and outcome stage. However, in this version, the participants were motivated 
to avoid a loud, white noise burst of 1000-ms. The bets (5 dB, 10 dB) reflected the decibel level 
that would either be added or subtracted from a standard starting point for every trial. The 
probabilities of winning will be the same as they were in the monetary task (30%, 40%, 50%, 
60% or 70%). If the participant won, the bet size was subtracted and the participant heard a 
softer noise. If the participant lost, the bet size was added and the participant heard a louder 
noise. The same feedback phase was used for the NGT. Following the feedback phase, a screen 
with the amount of decibels that were added or subtracted was displayed in the center during the 
outcome phase. A speaker was also displayed in the corner while the noises were administered. 
There were similar bonus trials on the NGT. The participants had a chance to lower the volume 
of the noise burst to 0 on bonus trials, again to promote picking the high bet on a low probability 
trial. 
 In terms of behavior, dependent variables were taken from the betting phase of both 
tasks: average bet size, average bet size post-errors, average decision times for selection, and 
average decision times for selection post-errors. In terms of appetitive and aversive system 
response: ERPs were measured in response to the feedback stage (blue vs. red circles by bet size 
and probability of wining). 	
Analyses 
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EEG Acquisition/Analysis. Electroencephalographic (EEG) data was collected during 
both the monetary and noise gambling tasks. EEG data was acquired through 128-electrode 
Geodesic Sensor Nets (EGI, Eugene) at a sampling rate of 250 Hz referenced to the vertex with 
.1-100 Hz analog filtering. The EEG was digitally filtered offline at 20 Hz, and segmented into 
550-ms epochs from 150-ms before to 400-ms after feedback onset. Epochs were screened for 
artifacts (e.g., eye blinks and movement, participant motion) using EGI’s Netstation artifact 
detection tool and artifact free epochs were sorted by condition and averaged to create the ERPs. 
ERPs extracted from the feedback stage were sorted into conditions based on the probability of 
winning, bet size and feedback, yielding 12 outcomes per task1. See Table 3 for a list of 
conditions. Due to the nature of the gambling task, some participants had missing conditions and 
were therefore excluded from the ERP analysis (n=85). Average ERPs were then baseline 
corrected over the 150-ms pre-stimulus period and re-referenced to the average reference. 
Individual ERPs were averaged across all subjects to create the grand average (Figure 5). The 
FRN was defined as the amplitude between 220-260-ms post feedback onset over a montage of 
medial frontal electrodes. The montage included the following electrodes: 4, 5, 6, 11,12,19, 20, 
and 118 (see Figure 5 for electrode map). 6 win-minus-loss difference waves were created for 
each task within each probability and bet size2. The win-loss differences will be referred to as 
RewPR on the monetary gambling task (reward) and RewPP on the noise gambling task 
(punishment). 
																																																								
1 Note that 30% and 40% trials were averaged together to create a “low probability of winning” condition to ensure 
that there were enough trials for ERP analysis. The same method was used to create a “high probability of winning” 
condition with 60% and 70% trials. All 50% trials were averaged together and are referred to as “medium 
probability of winning”. 
2 Difference waves (RewPd) were created by subtracting losses from wins within each probability and bet size, i.e., 
1) high probability, high bet wins minus high probability, high bet losses 2) high probability low bet wins minus 
high probability, low bet losses 3) medium probability, high bet wins minus medium probability, high bet losses 4) 
medium probability, low bet wins minus medium probability, low bet losses 5) low probability, high bet wins minus 
low probability, high bet losses 6) low probability, low bet wins minus low probability, low bet losses. 
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Statistical Analyses 
First, to test the effects of the experiment on the RewP/FRN, we performed a 2 x 3 x 2 x 
2 (task x probability x bet size x feedback) repeated measures ANOVA on the individual ERP 
scores. A 2 x 3 x 2 (task x probability x bet size) repeated measures ANOVA was performed to 
test for differences RewPd. To test the effects of the experiment on behavior, we performed 2 
separate 2 x 3 (task x probability) repeated measures ANOVAs on bet size and decision time. 
We also performed a 2 x 2 (task x prior outcome) repeated measures ANOVA to test for post-
error effects on bet size and decision time. Follow up comparisons are reported for significant 
interactions. We also performed Pearson Bivariate Correlations between the self-reported 
measures of BIS/BAS and behavior on the task (i.e., average bet). 
 Next, the factor structure of the appetitive and aversive systems was examined using 
Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA). Model fit was evaluated using chi-square, root mean 
square error of approximation (RMSEA; Browne, Cudeck, Bollen, & Long, 1993) and 
comparative fit index (CFI; Bentler, 1990). Model fit was considered acceptable if CFI >.90 (Hu 
& Bentler, 1999) and RMSEA < .08 (Browne et al., 1993). A non-significant chi-square value is 
also indicative of good model fit, although this index is dramatically influenced by sample size. 
A two-factor model was fit to the data including a latent appetitive system factor consisting of 
ERPs on the MGT, scores on the BIS-11, and SR scores, and a latent aversive system factor 
consisting of ERPs on the NGT, scores on the STAI, and SP scores.	These factors were included 
in a structural equation model that regresses externalizing behavior3 on the latent appetitive and 
aversive system factors (Figure 10).	
																																																								
3 Another model was performed where a latent risk-taking factor was regressed on the appetitive and aversive 
system factors. The latent risk-taking factor included both behavior on the task and self-reported externalizing 
behavior. As the model fit was poor, we analyzed the effect of appetitive and aversive system functioning on task 
behavior through bivariate correlations. 
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Results 
Task Behavior 
 Average Bet. There was a significant main effect of task on bet size, F(132) = 7.29, p = 
.008, partial η2 = .05. Participants bet higher on the MGT compared to the NGT, EMD = .001, 
95% CI [.0003, .002]. There was also a significant main effect for probability on bet size, F(132) 
= 133.23, p < .001, partial η2 = .67. Average bets were lowest for a low probability of winning, 
in the middle for 50% chance of winning, and highest for a high probability of winning. See 
Table 4 for means and standard deviations. The interaction between task and probability was also 
significant, F(132) = 4.51, p = .013, partial η2 = .06. Participants bet similarly on the MGT and 
NGT when the probability of winning was low (p > .05). Higher bets were observed in the MGT 
for both 50% probabilities, EMD = .003, 95% CI [.001, .004] and high probabilities, EMD = 
.002, 95% CI [.0003, .003]. 
 Average Decision Times. There was a significant main effect for probability on decision 
time, F(132) = 17.80, p < .001, partial η2 = .21. Decision times were slowest to a low 
probability of winning, in the middle to a 50% chance of winning, and fastest to a high 
probability of winning. See Table 4 for means and standard deviations. All other effects were not 
significant (p’s > .05). 
Bet Size Post Error. Again, there was a main effect of task, F(132) = 6.85, p = .01, 
partial η2, where participants bet higher on the MGT than the NGT, EMD = .001, 95% CI 
[.0003, .002]. There was also a main effect of previous trial outcome, F(132) = 58.75, p < .001, 
partial η2  = .31, where participants bet higher following losses compared to wins, EMD = -
.001, 95% CI [.0006, .001]. There was no interaction between task and previous trial. 
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Decision Time Post Error. There was a main effect of previous trial outcome, F(132) = 
25.93, p < 001, partial η2  = .16, such that participants were slower to make a decision after 
winning trials compared to losing trials, EMD = 25.96, 95% CI [15.87, 36.04]. All other effects 
were not significant (p’s > .05). For all behavioral effects, see Figure 9. For correlations among 
self-reported BIS/BAS functioning, ERPs and behavior, see Table 5. 
Physiological Data 
Overall Model. There was one significant main effect for feedback, F(84) = 94.57, p 
<.001, partial η2 = .53, where wins elicited more positive amplitudes compared to losses, EMD 
= 1.27, 95% CI [1.01, 1.53]. All other main effects were not significant (p’s <.05). There was a 
significant interaction between task and bet, F(84) = 4.90, p =.03, partial η2  = .05. Small bets 
elicited a more negative ERP than large bets, EMD = -.35, 95% CI [-.63, -.07], but only in the 
NGT, not the MGT. There was a significant interaction between bet and feedback, F(84) = 
18.40, p <.001, partial η2  = .18. Specifically, within winning trials, high bets elicited more 
positive waves than low bets, but not within losing trials, EMD = .57, 95% CI [.26, .88]. 
There was also a significant interaction between probability, bet, and feedback, F(83) = 
3.99, p =.02, partial η2 = .08. For low probabilities: small bets elicited more negative ERPs 
than large bets for both wins, EMD = -.92, 95% CI [-1.37, -.47] and losses, EMD = -.40, 95% CI 
[-.78, -.02]. There were no significant differences between bet sizes within medium probabilities. 
For high probabilities: small bets also elicited more negative ERPs than large bets, but only for 
wins, EMD = -.46, 95% CI [-.90, -.02]. For low bets, small probabilities were more negative than 
medium probabilities, but only when the outcome was winning, EMD = -.40, 95% CI [-.76, -
.04]. For low bets: large probabilities were also more negative than medium probabilities, but 
only when the outcome was losing, EMD = -.42, 95% CI [-.78, -.06]. That is, low probability, 
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low bet wins were more negative than medium probability, low bet wins while high probability, 
low bet losses were more negative than medium probability, low bet losses. For high bets, 
probabilities did not differ within wins or within losses. Last, wins elicited more positive waves 
than losses for all probabilities and all bet sizes. See Table 6 for all ERP means and standard 
deviations. See Figure 5 for waveforms and Figure 6 for scalp topographies. 
MGT. While the four-way interaction including task was not significant, we had specific 
a priori hypotheses about which conditions would elicit the most positive and most negative 
waveforms within each task. We performed two separate 3 x 2 x 2 (probability x bet x feedback) 
ANOVAs for each task. For the MGT, there was a significant main effect of bet where high bets 
elicited more positive waveforms than low bets, F(83) = 6.13, p =.015, partial η2 = .07. There 
was also a significant main effect of feedback where wins elicited more positive waves than 
losses, F(84) = 78.11, p < .001, partial η2 = .48. The bet by feedback interaction was 
significant, showing that bet sizes were distinguished within wins (higher waves for higher bet 
sizes) but not losses, F(84) = 11.95, p = .001, partial η2 = .13.  
NGT. For the NGT, the main effect of bet was not significant. Similar to the MGT, there 
was a significant main effect of feedback where wins elicited more positive waves than losses, 
F(84) = 62.81, p < .001, partial η2 = .43. The bet by feedback interaction was significant, F(84) 
= 11.29, p = .001, partial η2 = .12 but showed a different patter of results compared with the 
MGT. For wins, higher bets elicited higher amplitudes; for losses, higher bets elicited lower 
amplitudes. Additionally, the feedback by probability interaction was significant, F(83) = 3.15, p 
= .048, partial η2 = .07. Within wins, probabilities did not differ. Within losses, waves were 
more negative to low probability of winning compared to medium probability of winning and 
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were more negative to higher probability of winning compared to medium probability of 
winning. For both MGT and NGT interaction plots, see Figure 7. 
Difference Waves. The waves representing the difference between losses and wins was 
analyzed for each probability and bet size. There was a significant main effect of bet where high 
bets elicited higher RewPd amplitude, F(84) = 18.39, p <.001, partial η2 = .18. However an 
interaction between probability and bet, F(83) = 3.99, p  = .02, partial η2 = .09, showed that 
this was only true for the low and medium probabilities of winning, not for a high probability of 
winning. That is, high bets elicited higher RewPd amplitudes than low bets, EMD = 1.32, 95% CI 
[.78, 1.85] and EMD = .62, 95% CI [.14, 1.09], respectively. Within high bets, probabilities did 
not differ. Within low bets, low probability of winning elicited smaller RewPd amplitudes, EMD 
= -.60, 95% CI [-1.14, -.06]. See Table 7 for means and standard deviations of the RewPd 
amplitudes. See Figure 8 for difference waves. 
Overall SEM Model 
 As hypothesized, we confirmed a two-factor correlated model4 where the appetitive 
system factor was indicated by impulsivity, sensitivity to reward, and RewPR and the aversive 
system factor was indicated by anxiety, sensitivity to punishment, and RewPP. Model fit indices 
were within the acceptable range (χ2 = 22.417, p = .032, CFI = .93, RMSEA = .08). The 
appetitive system factor positively and significantly predicted externalizing behavior, whereas 
the aversive system factor negatively and significantly predicted externalizing behavior. 
Appetitive and aversive system functioning were positively correlated. The model explained 
																																																								
4 We also ran a model with gender as a covariate. Model fit was still acceptable (χ2 = 32.70, p = .008, CFI = .91, 
RMSEA = .08). The model yielded similar results, but the paths between appetitive/aversive system and 
externalizing were no longer significant. However, we chose not to explore these relationships further, as we 
determined that the sample size was too small for males (n=51) to run the paths separately for males and females.  
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78.1% of the variance in externalizing. Standardized and unstandardized estimates are reported 
in Figure 10. 
Discussion 2 
In Experiment 2, we aimed to demonstrate that the ACC is engaged by both appetitive 
and aversive outcomes in an active, decision-making task that administered both appetitive and 
aversive stimuli. Specifically, participants could make a high or a low bet based on a known (but 
covertly manipulated) probability. In the monetary task, participants could either gain or lose 
money based on the bet size they chose. In the noise task, participants could either hear a loud 
aversive noise or a soft noise, where the volume was based on the chosen bet size. 
The results largely supported a reward prediction error model of the RewP/FRN in both 
tasks. Specifically, wins always elicited more positive waveforms than losses, regardless of the 
bet size or probability of winning. High bets also elicited more positive waveforms than low 
bets, but this was only true for wins, not losses. For losses, high and low bets were identical 
except for 50/50 trials. On 50/50 trials, high bets elicited more negative waveforms than low 
bets. In terms of the probability of winning, for winning trials, probabilities were similar within 
high and low bets. However, when the probability of winning was high, but the trial was losing, 
a much more negative wave was observed than 50/50 or low probability of winning trials. To 
summarize, bet size was represented more in the winning domain, whereas probability was 
represented more in the losing domain. There were no significant interactions involving task; 
however, the difference between low probability of winning, high bet losses and low probability 
of winning, low bet losses was significant in the noise task but not the monetary task suggesting 
that the ACC responds differently (at least partly) to appetitive and aversive loss. Remarkably, 
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these results contrast greatly with those of Experiment 1 and will be considered in the following 
discussion. 
These results are largely consistent with previous research and a major meta-analysis that 
reported an overall reward prediction error effect on the FRN (Sambrook & Goslin, 2015). 
However, magnitude, a necessary component of a reward prediction error, did not affect FRN 
amplitude to losses, a result that has been reported before (Kujawa, Smith, Luhmann, & Hajcak, 
2013; Riepl, Mussel, Osinsky, & Hewig, 2016). As typical experiments present both valence and 
magnitude information at the same time, it is possible that the magnitude effects are masked by 
the valence effects (Gu et al., 2011). In our study, the participants chose the magnitude of the 
outcome and only waited to see if it would be a win or a loss. Therefore, magnitude might not 
have been the most relevant piece of information. Indeed research suggests that the FRN 
responds to the feedback information that is made most salient (Nieuwenhuis, Yeung, Holroyd, 
Schurger, & Cohen, 2004). Alternatively, others have argued that the RewP is a separate 
component representing a RPE, while the waveform observed to losses is a typical N200 
response (Holroyd et al., 2008; Proudfit, 2015). Supporting this model, several others have 
reported expected value effects only in the gain domain, but not in the loss domain (KreuSSel et 
al., 2012; Sambrook, Roser, & Goslin, 2012; San Martin et al., 2010). 
While there were no large ERP differences between the tasks, there is some evidence for 
a dissociation between the processing of appetitive and aversive stimuli. First, bet size 
differentially had an effect on loss trials where one expected to lose between tasks. Specifically, 
large bet losses elicited a more negative wave than small bet losses on the NGT but not the 
MGT. Second, bet size differentially had an effect on win trials where one expected to win 
between tasks. Specifically, large bet wins elicited a larger positivity than small bet wins on the 
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MGT, but not the NGT. In addition, there were significant behavioral differences between the 
tasks. While bet sizes tracked the probability of winning closely (i.e., lower bets were observed 
for a lower probability of winning), higher bets were observed in the MGT than the NGT for 
both 50/50 trials and high probability of winning trials. Moreover, decision times on the NGT 
were marginally slower; however, this could have been due to the unfamiliarity of gambling with 
noise. While these results were expected, they suggest that appetitive and aversive systems may 
have differential impacts on decision-making. 
Notably, the ERP results of Experiment 2 are drastically different from Experiment 1. To 
summarize, Experiment 1 found that ERPS within the FRN time range were most positive to the 
unexpected delivery of a motivational stimulus and most negative to the unexpected withholding 
of a motivational stimulus, regardless of valence, supporting the PRO model (Alexander & 
Brown, 2011). On the other hand, Experiment 2 found that ERPs within the FRN time range 
were most positive to wins and most negative to losses, supporting the RPE model (Holroyd & 
Coles, 2002; Holroyd et al., 2008). There were two main differences between the designs. First, 
Experiment 1 was a passive task where the participants had no say in the outcome, where 
Experiment 2 allowed the participants to chose between two magnitudes. Second, Experiment 1 
only either delivered or withheld an outcome. There was no magnitude manipulation and it was 
impossible to “lose”, whereas in Experiment 2 one could increase or decrease the magnitude of 
the outcomes. Therefore, the differences in the results could be due to either of these 
modifications. Alternatively, it could suggest that ACC responses adapt to the possible outcomes 
in a given situation, which is the case of dopamine neurons (Tobler, Fiorillo, & Schultz, 2005). 
Future studies might look to directly test the FRN response to passive/active and magnitude/no 
magnitude manipulations.   
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General Discussion 
In order to test if the appetitive and aversive systems have individual contributions to 
decision-making, we performed an SEM model where ERPs on the monetary task (along with 
self-reported reward sensitivity and impulsivity) and ERPs on the noise task (along with self-
reported punishment sensitivity and anxiety) predicted externalizing behavior. Results were 
largely in support of our hypotheses: 1) we confirmed a two-factor model of appetitive and 
aversive motivational system functioning 2) higher appetitive system functioning (BAS) 
significantly predicted RTB 3) lower aversive system functioning (BIS) significantly predicted 
RTB.  
 A large amount of research on the BAS supports these results. High BAS is observed in 
risk-taking populations such as those with bi-polar disorder (Meyer, Johnson, & Winters, 2001), 
ADHD (Johnson, Turner, & Iwata, 2003), and psychopathy (Newman, MacCoon, Vaughn, & 
Sadeh, 2005; Newman, Wallace, Schmitt, & Arnett, 1997). Additionally, high BAS is related to 
college substance use (Franken & Muris, 2006), clinically diagnosed substance users (Franken, 
Muris, & Georgieva, 2006), and alcohol use populations (Kambouropoulos & Staiger, 2007). 
While our overall model just included self-reported externalizing behavior, higher BAS is also 
related to in lab risky decision-making on gambling tasks (Kim & Lee, 2011). In support of this, 
we found that higher scores on the impulsivity scale were related to larger average bets on the 
MGT. The same pattern was not found for average bets on the NGT, suggesting that the BAS 
may not be activated to gambling tasks that only involve avoidance of aversive stimuli. Similarly 
	 44 
to the studies of personality, higher levels of DA, as assessed by DA genetics, are associated 
with greater activation in the reward pathway during reward anticipation (Yacubian et al., 2007). 
Taken together, these results support a DA-related BAS. 
On the other hand, the relationship between BIS and RTB is less well defined in the 
literature. A commonly reported finding is that lower BIS is associated with greater RTB (Corr, 
2002). Additionally, higher BIS is observed in anxious individuals (Vervoort et al., 2010), a 
population which typically displays risk-avoidant behavior (Maner et al., 2007). However, some 
studies have reported the opposite. For example, both ADHD and problem gambling populations 
display higher risk-taking behavior, but also score higher on measures of punishment sensitivity 
(Humphreys & Lee, 2011; Loxton, Nguyen, Casey, & Dawe, 2008). Differences in these 
findings could be due to the type of externalizing behavior measured. One study separated 
aggressive behavior from disinhibition and reported that low BIS was only related to increased 
aggression and not disinhibition (Carlson et al., 2013). Similarly, another study reported that low 
BIS predicted drug abuse and hyperactive ADHD symptoms, while high BIS predicted 
psychopathy and inattentive ADHS symptoms (Hundt, Kimbrel, Mitchell, & Nelson-Gray, 
2008). In both studies, higher BAS predicted all types of externalizing. In terms of in lab risk-
taking, low BIS also predicts riskier choice (Eitle & Taylor, 2010; Kim & Lee, 2011). Similarly, 
we found that low scores on the SP scale predicted higher average bets on the MGT, but not the 
NGT. We did expect BIS to be related to risk-taking on the NGT; however, a recently updated 
model of the RST suggests that fear and anxiety are separate processes (Perkins, Kemp, & Corr, 
2007). In this study, we only measured BIS/BAS and did not separate fear from anxiety, which 
could help explain why BIS was not related to bets on the NGT. 
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In our sample, appetitive and aversive system factors were positively correlated, but had 
differential effects on RTB. These results are supported by a large amount of research that aims 
to distinguish appetitive and aversive motivational system pathways in the brain. Most studies 
report distinct as well as common areas (Hayes et al., 2014). For example, one study investigated 
the role of the substantia nigra (SN) and VTA in appetitive and aversive conditioning and 
reported that ventromedial SN was related to learning about appetitive outcomes, while the 
dorsolateral region was related to learning about aversive outcomes (Pauli et al., 2015). This 
suggests that while SN and VTA may both be involved in reward and punishment processing, 
distinct areas within these regions may have separable functions. Similarly, anticipation for 
appetitive and aversive stimuli is represented in distinct and overlapping areas. The ventral 
striatum and vmPFC were activated during anticipation for viewing pleasant pictures, while 
dlPFC and ACC were activated during anticipation for both pleasant and unpleasant pictures 
(Sege, Bradley, Weymar, & Lang, 2017). Additionally, separate neurotransmitter systems 
differentially affect BIS/BAS responding. In one study, low serotonin levels enhanced sensitivity 
to aversive stimuli, but not appetitive stimuli, while low dopamine levels reduced sensitivity to 
appetitive stimuli, but had no effect on aversive stimuli (Hebart & Gläscher, 2015). 
The BAS is hypothesized to represent the response of the dopamine reward system to 
appetitive cues, while the BIS is hypothesized to represent the response of several systems to 
aversive cues, including the septohippocampal system and the amygdala (Depue & Collins, 
1999; Gray & McNaughton, 2003). However, while these systems are hypothesized to be 
distinct, often humans have to evaluate punishments or costs that are involved with obtaining a 
reward. The ACC is involved in both reward and punishment processing and has major 
connections to both systems, putting it at a good spot to evaluate cost-benefit ratios (Skvortsova 
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et al., 2014). Supporting this hypothesis, we measured the ACC response to both appetitive and 
aversive outcomes and reported correlated factors that had distinct effects on decision-making. 
While the ACC may evaluate cost-benefit ratios, these ratios may be pulled to one side or the 
other by separate hyper- or hypo-sensitive input from appetitive and aversive motivational 
systems. 
Limitations and Future Directions 
Very few studies have attempted to combine both self-report and physiological measures of 
appetitive and aversive motivational systems to predict decision-making. The data presented here 
largely supports a high BAS and low BIS model of risk-taking. However, these results are 
qualified by several limitations. First, we had a predominantly female sample and evidence 
suggests males score higher on measures of risk-taking (Byrnes, Miller, & Schafer, 1999). We 
were unable to measure sex differences due to the limited sample size by gender to model the 
SEM separately. We also had an undergraduate sample with no participants reporting a major 
substance use or psychological disorder. Therefore, the generalizability of these results to other 
genders and non-undergraduate populations is low. Next, some suggest that the RewP/FRN 
effect is explained by two overlapping components: the N200 and the Reward Positivity. There 
is evidence that suggests accounting for overlapping components may lead to differing results 
(Holroyd et al., 2008). As we analyzed the raw waveforms, it is possible that performing other 
analytical methods such as Principal Components Analysis or Time-Frequency Analysis to 
decompose coinciding components could change these results. Additionally, it is hypothesized 
that the FRN reflects ACC activity (Cohen, Cavanagh, & Slagter, 2011); however, others suggest 
that the RewP reflects striatal activity (Foti, Weinberg, Dien, & Hajcak, 2011). Due to the nature 
of ERPs, spatial resolution is low. Therefore, we cannot be certain that the components are in 
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fact reflecting activity of the MFC. Finally, as these data were cross sectional, temporal 
precedence was not established. Future studies could look to longitudinal and experimental 
designs to replicate these findings.   
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Table 1. Sample Demographic Information (n=134) 
Category Group % 
Gender Male 38.8 
 Female 60.4 
 Other/Not Specified .7 
Ethnicity Hispanic or Latino 33.1 
 Not Hispanic or Latino 66.1 
 Not Specified .8 
Race American Indian/Alaska Native 1.5 
 Asian 6.0 
 Black or African American 11.2 
 Mixed/Multiracial 8.2 
 White 59.7 
 Other/Not Specified 13.5 
Year in College Freshman 32.6 
 Sophomore 19.7 
 Junior 30.3 
 Senior 17.4 
Age 18-20 70.1 
 21-30 24.7 
 31+ 5.2 	
 
Table 2. Scale Descriptive Statistics 
Scale Min Max Mean Std. Dev Alpha 
IMP 41 84 61.02 8.87 .783 
SR 0 22 10.35 5.16 .848 
ANX 20 70 40.50 11.56 .931 
SP 0 24 11.40 6.46 .905 
EXT 13 199 84.74 44.65 .954 
Note. IMP = impulsivity measured by the Barratt Impulsiveness Scale, SR = sensitivity to reward 
measured by the Sensitivity to Reward and Punishment Scale, ANX = anxiety measured by the 
State-Trait Anxiety Inventory, SP = sensitivity to punishment measured by the Sensitivity to 
Reward and Punishment Scale and EXT = externalizing measured by the Externalizing 
Inventory-brief. 		
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Table 3. Mean Number of Trials Per Condition 
Probability Bet Feedback MGT NGT 
High High Win 59.29 56.76 
High High Loss 59.14 56.31 
High Low Win 20.13 22.65 
High Low Loss 20.22 23.00 
Medium High Win 46.05 41.65 
Medium High Loss 45.07 41.14 
Medium Low Win 33.41 37.83 
Medium Low Loss 34.26 38.29 
Low High Win 23.26 23.04 
Low High Loss 23.59 23.51 
Low Low Win 56.01 56.30 
Low Low Loss 55.77 55.86 
 
Note. Probability refers to the probability of winning. High bets refer to $0.10 on the monetary 
gambling task and 10 dBs on the noise gambling task. Low bets refer to $0.05 on the monetary 
gambling task and 5 dBs on the noise gambling task. 
 
Table 4. Behavioral Data Means and Standard Deviations 
DV Condition Task 
Bet Size  MGT NGT 
Probability Low .0644(.0111) .0644(.0112) 
 Medium .0787(.0117) .0761(.0124) 
 High .0876(.0095) .0860(.0105) 
  MGT NGT 
Prior Outcome Post Win .0761(.0075) .0748(.0077) 
 Post Loss .0769(.0075) .0756(.0079) 
Decision Time  MGT NGT 
Probability Low 908.03(362.63) 936.62(413.80) 
 Medium 873.37(413.58) 891.95(410.01) 
 High 829.90(369.04) 859.08(387.58) 
  MGT NGT 
Prior Outcome Post Win 863.42(378.85) 892.54(399.63) 
 Post Loss 837.53(361.87) 866.52(368.61) 
Note. Probability refers to the probability of winning. 
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Table 5. Correlations Among Personality, ERPs, and Task Behavior 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1. IMP -               
2. SR .380** -             
3. ANX .407** .247** -           
4. SP .234** .390** .590** -         
5. RewPR .082 .142 -.051 .026 -       
6. RewPP -.181 -.099 -.148 -.158 .066 -     
7. BetR .215* .043 .012 -.223* -.054 -.117 -   
8. BetP .058 .076 -.030 -.080 .128 -.215* .702** - 
Note. IMP = impulsivity measured by the Barratt Impulsiveness Scale, SR = sensitivity to reward 
measured by the Sensitivity to Reward and Punishment Scale, ANX = anxiety measured by the 
State-Trait Anxiety Inventory, SP = sensitivity to punishment measured by the Sensitivity to 
Reward and Punishment Scale, RewPR = RewP on the monetary task, RewPP = RewP on the 
noise task, BetR = average bet on the monetary task, and BetP = average bet on the noise task. 
 
Table 6. ERP Means and Standard Deviations by Condition 
Probability Bet Feedback MGT NGT 
High High Win 1.24(3.12) 1.44(2.92) 
High High Loss -0.32(2.64) -0.27(2.91) 
High Low Win 0.56(3.24) 1.20(2.99) 
High Low Loss -0.44(3.07) -0.14(3.13) 
Medium High Win 1.40(3.29) 1.25(2.69) 
Medium High Loss -0.36(2.69) 0.06(3.19) 
Medium Low Win 1.05(3.83) 0.93(2.69) 
Medium Low Loss -0.10(2.80) 0.36(3.00) 
Low High Win 1.67(3.49) 1.36(3.32) 
Low High Loss -0.21(3.02) -0.56(2.75) 
Low Low Win 0.44(2.83) 0.74(2.84) 
Low Low Loss -0.19(3.18) 0.22(2.44) 
Note. These data reflect the ERP sample where n=85. 
 
	 51 
 
Table 7. RewPd Means and Standard Deviations 
MGT Mean SD 
Low Prob Low Bet 0.63 1.88 
Low Prob High Bet 1.88 3.09 
Med Prob Low Bet 1.15 2.75 
Med Prob High Bet 1.76 2.50 
High Prob Low Bet 1.00 3.21 
High Prob High Bet 1.56 2.32 
NGT Mean SD 
Low Prob Low Bet 0.52 1.94 
Low Prob High Bet 1.91 2.90 
Med Prob Low Bet 0.57 2.19 
Med Prob High Bet 1.19 2.58 
High Prob Low Bet 1.34 3.23 
High Prob High Bet 1.71 2.10 
Note. RewPd amplitudes represent win-loss differences for each probability and magnitude. Prob 
= probability, med = medium, MGT = monetary gambling task, NGT = noise gambling task. 
These data reflect the ERP sample where n=85. 
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Figure 1. An example trial in the PPT block (top) and the RPT block (bottom). Trials reflect an 
unpredicted punishment and unpredicted reward. White noise bursts were played for 1000-ms 
while the speaker was displayed, while a cash noise was played while the running total was 
displayed. 
 
Figure 2. ERPs on the Reward Prediction Task (left) and Punishment Prediction Task (right). 
The montage is indicated by the electrode map. Highlighted areas show the time windows. 
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Figure 3. Scalp topographies for unexpectedly delivered and withheld outcomes. Appetitive 
outcomes included money and aversive outcomes included loud noise bursts. Withheld outcomes 
elicited later negative topographies, while delivered outcomes displayed earlier positive 
topographies (withheld outcomes displayed at ~260ms and delivered outcomes are displayed at 
~190ms). 
 
 
Figure 4. Example of a 70% chance of winning, low bet loss trial on the monetary gambling task 
(top) and noise gambling task (bottom). Participants started with $5 in the bank, as not to go into 
negatives for the monetary task. Note that noise burst volume was reset for each trial while 
winning and losing money was additive across trials.	
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Figure 5. ERPs on the Monetary Gambling Task (top) and Noise Gambling Task (bottom) for 
each probability of winning. The y-axis displayed microvolts and the x-axis displays 
milliseconds. The electrode map indicates the montage of electrodes used and the boxes indicate 
time windows. 																					
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Figure 6. Scalp topographies on the Monetary Gambling Task (two left columns) and Noise 
Gambling Task (two right columns). Topographies are displayed at 240ms. Bet descriptions are 
on the left and probability descriptions on the right. 	
			LOSS	 	 	 		WIN 	 	 		LOSS 	 										WIN	
Low	
Low	
High	
High	
Low	
Probability		
Medium	
Probability		
High	
Probability		
Low	
High	
	 56 
	
		
Figure 7. Amplitude means for probability x bet x feedback interactions. Winning outcomes are 
on the top and losing outcomes are on the bottom. A) Interaction means for the Monetary 
Gambling Task. B) Interaction means for the Noise Gambling Task. Error bars represent 
normalized within-subject standard errors (Cousineau, 2005). 															
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Figure 8. Difference wave plots for Monetary Gambling Task (left) and noise gambling task 
(right). Difference waves represent win-loss differences at each probability (high, medium, or 
low) followed by bet size (high or low). Time windows are indicated by the gray boxes. 																											
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Figure 9. 
Behavioral Data Interactions. Top Left: Average bet size by probability of winning. Top Right: 
Average decision time by probability of winning. Bottom Left: Average bet size by prior trial 
outcome. Bottom Right: Average decision time by prior trial outcome. 
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Figure 10. SEM standardized/unstandardized results. Note that * = p <.05 *** = p <.001. IMP = 
impulsivity measured by the Barratt Impulsiveness Scale, SR = sensitivity to reward measured 
by the Sensitivity to Reward and Punishment Scale, ANX = anxiety measured by the State-Trait 
Anxiety Inventory, SP = sensitivity to punishment measured by the Sensitivity to Reward and 
Punishment Scale, RewPR = RewP on the monetary task, and EXT = scores on the Externalizing 
Inventory-brief. 		
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